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progress is beyond human control. If we get the idea that things are developing in accordance with great natural or spiritual laws, that progress is somehow bound up in the nature of things, that development is an inherent necessity, and that therefore we, whenever we please, can "take a moral holiday," then, I dare say, we have mistaken the function of thought in human experience. To shift the burden of progress on to natural law, or on to sociological gravitation, or to the evolution of some Hegelian world-spirit, and thereby to exempt ourselves from accountability, is to revert from progress to change. Progress is neither a happy cosmic accident nor a divine gift, it is a human achievement. If things are to become better, if society is to improve, if civilization is to advance, it will be because human beings, conscious of the power of intelligence to participate in the production of progress, feel a moral constraint to use their minds in the enlightened pursuit of the good. It is here that "intelligence and morals" unite. There is a "moral responsibility to be intelligent" as well as an "intellectual obligation to be moral." And in that consists, not only the spirit, but also the spirituality of the idea of modern.

To use the mind for the purpose of getting to places hitherto unexplored, places in themselves worth getting to, and the consequent moral constraint so to do—this, or something like this, is Bacon's theoretical programme of reform. And in terms of ideals like these we would characterize the spirit of modernity.

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## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*The Psychology of the Great War.* GUSTAVE LeBON. Translated by E. ANDREWS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1916. Pp. 480.

The title of this book does not convey a correct idea of its scope. It might better have been called "Reflections on the Great War." This would have been at the same time a more and a less pretentious title. For while the book does contain a remarkably varied and interesting assortment of ideas suggested to a thoughtful observer by the events of the day, it is not a scientific treatise. It would probably be impossible for any living man to write a scientific psychology of the war, partly because psychology is not at present provided with the necessary principles and methods, and partly because sufficient data are not yet available. M. LeBon does not pretend to confine himself to psychological considerations. He summarizes the economic and political evolution of modern Germany, discusses the economic

and political causes of the war, collects and quotes the more important diplomatic exchanges that immediately preceded the outbreak of the war, describes the novelties of modern warfare, roundly abuses the Germans, and speculates on the strategy of the battle of the Marne. Although he speaks in the name of psychology, what he has to say on these topics does not differ from what any fairly well-informed contemporary might say. Most of it is generally familiar, and it is journalistic in its style and in its sources. Unfortunately it is journalistic even to the extent of omitting all references to the sources which he does use. This must not be taken to imply that the book is not valuable. It would be valuable if it were only as a collection of excerpts from newspapers, interviews, letters, and state papers. But it is more than this; it is an informing and stimulating book. I mean only that it is not what the author seemingly intends it to be, namely, an explanation of the war in terms of psychological laws.

Before turning to the author's psychology, there are several miscellaneous matters that are deserving of special mention. Thus it is interesting to note that he absolves Germany from the charge of having deliberately precipitated the war. He answers "the question of Who wanted the war? by saying, 'No one'"; and finds the immediate cause of the conflict in "the mutual distrust of the three Emperors" (p. 264). Germany, he thinks, expected Russia to back down, and then when she did not do so, was afraid to lose the advantage of prior mobilization. The lessons which France is to learn from the war are two, discipline and realism. She has been weakened by factional dissension and by her illusions concerning the power of words and of moral forces. The author is not hopeful of a lasting peace. "First of all," he says, "we must set aside the childish babblings of the pacifists, who tell us that peace results from the triumph of the right" (p. 461). But it may come, he admits, as a result of "economic and social necessities," which for some reason he regards as something very different from right. He adds new horrors to the rapidly growing exhibit of German moral pathology; but he adds nothing to the explanation of it. The German mind remains for him what it is for most enemy and neutral observers, a strange and unaccountable mixture of opposites, of brutality and docility, unscrupulousness and honesty, efficiency and sentimentality.

Let us turn now to the psychological apparatus with which M. LeBon proposes to explain the phenomena of the war. He recognizes five forces: the biological, the affective, the collective, the mystic, and the intellectual. Each of these has a "logic" of its own and appears to operate independently of the others (pp. 27, 39). The first, which includes "hunger and desire," is barely mentioned.

The second, third, and fourth are magnified, the fifth belittled. In other words the author's thesis is that reason counts for little in human affairs as compared with affective, collective, and mystic forces. But the reader will be disappointed if he looks for any clear formulation of these conceptions. Thus he cites as affective influences Austrian race-hatred of the Serbians, Russia's fear of loss of prestige, French sense of honor, British moral obligation to protect Belgium, and German desire to humiliate Russia. Such motives are supposed to be extra-rational; but what sort of motive would then be rational does not appear. As a matter of fact the author nowhere cites an instance of a rational motive, except to say that "if rational logic had played any part at all in the will of her rulers," it would have caused Germany to avoid war at all costs (p. 172). This is because Germany's interest in world-dominion would have been served better by industry, commerce, and peaceful infiltration. In other words, a rational force is apparently an interested action founded on *correct* reasoning, or on reasoning that agrees with that of M. LeBon. But if so, then this is not a psychological matter at all; for whether a force was rational or not could then never be ascertained until it was justified or disproved by the sequel. If, on the other hand, a rational force is an interested action or policy founded on reasoning, then all of the affective forces enumerated are rational. It is just as rational to adopt a plan for satisfying your conscience or your honor or your self-respect as for satisfying your ambition. In short, M. LeBon's handling of the matter is naïve and antiquated. He fails to perceive the intimate interrelation between the factors of judgment and of feeling in human action, and he fails to recognize, as does Mr. Graham Wallas, for example, the important rôle of the reflective process in human conduct.

The author adds nothing in the present book to what he has already said on the collective mind. When he first said it, it had the merit of emphasizing something which had hitherto been neglected. But one can not read this book without feeling that such crude tools as "the national mind," "the ancestral mind," *etc.*, will not do the work. They need to be refined and sharpened before they can serve for purposes of explanation. Furthermore, the author appears to contradict himself on the question of the rôle of the individual leader. For he tells us on the one hand that "events so great and awe-inspiring can not have been dependent upon the will of any one man, but are rather due to deep-seated, remote, and varied causes which had been slowly piling up until the day when their effects swam suddenly into our ken" (p. 18); while on the other hand he tells us that "a collective opinion is usually derived from an individual opinion" and that the crowd is incapable of action without a leader to direct it (pp. 32, 33).

The "mystic" force, although it is the most important of all, is left appropriately shrouded in mystery. The author says of a certain M. Kostyleff: "I am very much afraid that he, as well as the many persons who still share his views, have no clear idea of what we are to understand by the term mysticism" (p. 167). The reader of this book finds himself in the same predicament. The only statement remotely resembling a definition is the statement that "generally speaking, one may say that mysticism is characterized by a taste for mystery (!), love of the supernatural, contempt of experience, and a belief that superior powers intervene in mundane phenomena" (p. 37). Among the "chief factors of the great conflicts of humanity," he cites "the mystic factors," such as "those forces which hurled the Arabs upon the Roman Empire," *etc.* So far it might appear that mysticism is the same thing as religion, which could scarcely be coordinated with affective and collective forces as a fundamental psychological category. But in the application to present events M. LeBon treats the patriotism of all the belligerent countries ("patriotism is an inherited quality of a mystic . . . nature" (p. 306)) and "the hegemony ideal" in German as mystic forces. The only notion that seems to be consistently preserved throughout is that a mystical force is not rational. How it is distinguished from affective and collective forces does not appear at all. M. LeBon says of mysticism that it is "the source of the easy explanations which satisfied mankind for centuries" (p. 37). The carping critic is tempted to say of the "mystic force" that it is the easy explanation which satisfies M. LeBon.

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*Standard Method of Testing Juvenile Mentality.* NORBERT J. MELVILLE. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1917. Pp. xi + 142.

Announcement was made several months ago of a volume which would furnish "a provisional uniform method of applying the Binet-Simon tests as regards test order, details of administering and scoring each test, *etc.*" The present book is the laboratory manual embodying this method, which Director Melville and his assistants have worked out at the psychological laboratory of the Philadelphia school of pedagogy.

In the preparation of this manual there has been a definite attempt to follow as closely as possible the suggestions of the Informal Conference on Binet Testing held at Buffalo a few years ago. To describe the book briefly, one may say that it is a rather valuable elaboration and attempted standardization of the Binet-Simon tests as finally revised by their authors in 1911.